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more	 punitive	 response	 from	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Much	 of	 the	 attention	 to	 date	 has	




of	 the	 original	 sentencing	 decision	 in	 R	 v	 Loveridge	 [2013]	 NSWSC	 1638,	 considerably	 less	
attention	has	been	paid	to	the	response	of	the	judiciary	to	alcohol‐related	violence.	This	article	
seeks	to	fill	that	gap.	Courts	play	an	important	role	in	shaping	the	contours	of	the	criminal	law,	
and	their	actions	deserve	scrutiny,	credit	and	criticism	 in	 the	same	way	as	 legislative	actions.	
Based	 primarily	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 2014	 decision	 of	 the	 NSW	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	
(NSWCCA)	in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120,	and	sentencing	decisions	made	subsequently,	
this	article	argues	that,	although	the	judicial	response	has	been	less	visible,	to	date	it	has	produced	
more	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	 criminal	 law’s	 treatment	 of	 violent,	 alcohol‐fuelled	 criminal	
behaviour	than	the	changes	made	by	the	NSW	Parliament.	
	
The	primary	 assertion	 of	 this	 article	 is	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 commonly	made	 claim	by	media	
commentators	and	politicians	that	judges	are	‘out	of	touch’	with,	and	unresponsive	to,	community	
sentiment	 on	 the	 seriousness	 of	 alcohol‐related	 violence,	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	 the	
NSWCCA	has	actively	recalibrated	the	‘correct’	approach	to	sentencing	in	such	cases,	and	that	this	




category’.	 This	 category,	 although	 crafted	 through	 the	 dispassionate	 language	 of	 sentencing	
principles,	has	many	of	the	hallmarks	(and	tropes)	that	dominated	media	and	political	discourse	
on	the	crisis	of	public	alcohol‐related	violence	in	the	period	after	the	one	punch	deaths	of	Thomas	










In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	of	 the	 events	 that	 propelled	 	 one	punch	




proved	 to	 be	 a	pivotal	 decision	 in	 recalibrating	 the	 approach	 to	 sentencing	offenders	 in	 such	
cases:	 the	decision	of	 the	NSWCCA	in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014].	 I	next	describe	 the	creation	of	 the	
Loveridge	category.	The	fourth	part	discusses	the	judicial	uptake	of	the	principles	espoused	by	
the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge,	including	recognition	that	it	represents	a	significant	shift	in	sentencing	























principles	 and	 practice	 regarding	 one	 punch	 fatalities	 (Quilter	 2014b).	 The	 charge	 of	
‘inconsistency’	stuck,	however,	and	the	foundation	for	NSWCCA	intervention	was	established.	It	
might	be	argued	that	consistency	is	only	desirable	in	political	discourse	if	it	connotes	consistently	






newspapers	 ran	major	 campaigns	 in	 relation	 to	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence.	The	 Sydney	Morning	




Within	 this	 context,	 the	 Government	 was	 under	 enormous	 pressure	 to	 respond	 to	 so‐called	
alcohol‐fuelled	one	punch	violence—particularly,	in	light	of	what	was	perceived	to	be	the	failure	
of	 the	 courts	 to	 deliver	 on	 a	 just	 sentence	 (see	Quilter	 2014a).	 On	21	 January	2014	 the	 then	
Premier	(O’Farrell)	announced	his	16‐point	plan	to	tackle	drug	and	alcohol	violence.	Only	a	week	
later,	 on	 30	 January	 2014,	 the	 NSW	 Parliament	 enacted	 the	 Crimes	 and	 Other	 Legislation	
Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	2014	(NSW)	(the	Act)—colloquially	known	as	the	One	





second	 time	 in	 recent	 NSW	 history	 that	 a	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentence	 (MMS)	 has	 been	
introduced.4		
	
Elsewhere	 I	 have	 discussed	 the	 poor	 drafting	 of	 this	 legislation	 and	 the	 adverse	 legal	 and	
operational	implications	(Quilter	2014a,	2015a).	Here	I	note	that	there	is	a	significant	disconnect	
between	the	‘solution’	produced	by	the	Act—that	is,	a	new	offence	of	‘assault	causing	death’—

























In	 determining	 the	 appropriate	 sentence	 for	 an	 offence,	 the	 self‐induced	
intoxication	of	 the	offender	 at	 the	 time	 the	offence	was	 committed	 is	 not	 to	be	
taken	into	account	as	a	mitigating	factor.	
	
Arguably	 the	 inclusion	 of	 this	 section	 also	 did	 not	 significantly	 alter	 expressed	 sentencing	





intoxication	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 in	 sentencing.7	 After	 investigating	 the	 matter	 and	
considering	 submissions	 from	 a	 range	 of	 stakeholders,	 the	 Sentencing	 Council	 rejected	 the	
proposal	 (NSW	Sentencing	Council	 2015:	 [0.6]‐[0.7],	 [2.23];	 see	 also	NSW	Sentencing	 Council	
2009).	 In	a	context	where	knee‐jerk	punitive	criminal	 law	reform	without	expert/stakeholder	
consultation	has	become	commonplace	(the	new	assault	causing	death	offence	being	a	classic	











2012‐13,	 and	 the	 Government’s	 2014	 legislative	 response,	 the	 courts	 had	 already	 begun	 to	







[manslaughter]’.8	 Yet,	 even	 before	 Loveridge,	 there	 was	 recognition	 that	 there	 was	 a	 tension	













may	 not	 have	 been	 sufficient	 to	 deter	 others	 from	 similar	 irresponsible	 criminal	
behaviour.	In	my	opinion	although	the	circumstances	of	an	individual	offence	and	
offender	must	always	be	considered,	this	Court	should	in	future	accept	that	more	
significant	 penalties	may	 be	 required	when	 sentencing	 offenders	 for	 this	 type	 of	
offence	[emphases	added].9	(at	[41])	
	
Significantly,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 violence	 being	 perpetrated	 in	 a	 public	 place	 after	 the	
consumption	of	alcohol—characteristic	of	a	majority	of	one	punch	manslaughters—was	said	to	
make	 the	 offence	 a	 serious	 one	 for	 which	 adequate	 punishment	 is	 required	 particularly	 for	
general	deterrence.10		
	




that	 in	some	cases	 the	public	nature	of	 the	commission	of	 the	offence	was	used	 to	assess	 the	










…	 Some	 attempt	 must	 be	 made	 however,	 to	 mark	 the	 objective	 gravity	 of	 the	
offence,	constituted	by	the	unlawful	taking	of	a	human	life,	with	a	sentence	that	
reflects	 the	 principles	 of	 punishment,	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 protection	 of	 the	
community,	and	the	rehabilitation	of	the	offenders.		
	
Whilst	 the	 starting	point	 in	 this	 sentencing	 exercise	 is	 the	unlawful	 taking	 of	 a	
human	 life,	 the	sentence	 to	be	 imposed	at	 law	 is	 constrained	by	 the	basis	upon	
which	the	plea	has	been	entered.	The	law	demands	that	the	offenders	be	sentenced	
for	an	offence	that	is,	objectively	speaking,	at	the	lower	end	of	the	available	range,	
[emphasis	 added]	 the	 upper	 limit	 of	 which	 is	 the	 maximum	 penalty.	 That	
maximum	 penalty	 encompasses	 a	 very	 broad	 range	 of	 manslaughter	 offences,	




At	 the	 time	 Loveridge	was	 sentenced	 in	 2013,	 these	 tensions	had	not	 yet	 been	 resolved.	 The	
Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions’	 announcement	 on	 14	 November	 2013	 that	 his	 Office	 would	











The	normal	course	of	action	when	a	sentence	is	argued	to	be	manifestly	 inadequate	 is	 for	 the	
Crown	to	appeal—which	is	what	occurred.	On	4	July	2014	(that	is,	5	months	after	the	introduction	
of	 the	new	offences),	 the	NSWCCA	upheld	that	appeal	 in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	finding	that	the	
original	sentence—which	included	an	8	year	head	sentence	for	manslaughter,	reduced	to	6	years	
after	application	of	the	guilty	plea	discount,	with	a	NPP	of	4	years—was	manifestly	inadequate.	

























punch	 manslaughters;	 secondly,	 it	 rejected	 any	 ‘range’	 for	 such	 matters;	 thirdly,	 the	 Court	






























With	 respect	 to	 a	 number	 of	 single‐blow	manslaughter	 sentencing	 decisions	 to	
which	his	Honour’s	attention	had	been	drawn	…	.	(at	[187])	
	






court	 for	 the	purpose	of	 the	provision	of	principles	 ‘relevant	 to	the	exercise	of	 the	sentencing	
discretion	in	the	case	at	hand’	(R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	at	[223])	following	the	High	Court	ruling	in	
Barbaro	v	R;	Zirilli	v	R	(2014)	305	ALR	323	and	Hili	v	R	(2010)	272	ALR	465,	a	numerical	range	











Gleeson	CJ	made	 this	 clear	 in	R	v	Blacklidge	…	 .	 (R	v	Loveridge	 [2014]	at	 [226]‐
[227])		
	
Thus,	 in	 relation	 to	manslaughter,	 the	 justification	 for	 denying	 the	 use	 of	 a	 numerical	 range	
appears	 to	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 premise	 that	 manslaughter,	 as	 a	 broadly	 defined	 offence,	




























to	 an	 appropriate	 range	 necessarily	 involves	 assumptions	 being	made	 by	 counsel	 as	 to	what	













Consistency	 of	 sentencing	 is	 important.	 But	 the	 consistency	 that	 is	 sought	 is	



















































Decisions	 since	 Loveridge	 make	 it	 clear	 that	 judges	 have	 heard	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 message	 in	
Loveridge:	no	sentencing	range	exists	for	one	punch	manslaughter	cases.14	However,	in	the	next	
part	of	this	article	I	argue	that	the	effect	of	the	NSWCCA’s	decision	in	Loveridge	was	that,	at	the	





A	 new	 category?	 Violence,	 public	 place,	 alcohol‐fuelled	 and	 the	 need	 for	 general	
deterrence	
Given	the	conviction	with	which	the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge	effected	the	demise	of	a	one	punch	
manslaughter	 category	 or	 sentencing	 range,	 it	might	 have	 been	 assumed	 that	 the	 Court	 was	
generally	opposed	to	such	categories/ranges.	On	the	contrary,	having	dismissed	the	one	punch	
category,	the	Court	immediately	recognised	a	new	one	of	manslaughter	involving:	(1)	violence,	





vary	 widely	 and	 attention	 must	 be	 given	 to	 the	 particular	 case	 before	 the	
sentencing	court.	
	




























other	 nonfatal	 attacks	 by	 the	 Respondent	 upon	 vulnerable,	 unsuspecting	 and	
innocent	citizens	in	the	crowded	streets	of	King	[sic]	Cross	on	a	Saturday	evening,	






Other	 decisions	 of	 this	 Court	 have	 emphasised	 that	 violence	 on	 the	 streets,	
especially	by	young	men	in	company	and	under	the	influence	of	alcohol	and	drugs,	
is	 all	 too	 common	 and	 needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 sentences	 that	 carry	 a	 very	
significant	 degree	 of	 general	 deterrence:	 R	 v	 Mitchell;	 R	 v	 Gallagher	 [2007]	
NSWCCA	296;	177	A	Crim	R	94	at	101	[29].	Even	in	the	case	of	juvenile	offenders	
(which	the	Respondent	is	not),	this	Court	has	emphasised	that,	in	relation	to	crimes	

















‘…	 the	 manslaughter	 cases	 with	 which	 we	 are	 concerned	 involved	 gratuitous,	











simply	 adjust	 the	 terminology	 from	 one	 punch	 to	 violence	 +	 alcohol	 +	 public	 (+	 random,	
unprovoked,	innocent	victim).	I	argue	that	it	replaced	one	category	(one	punch	manslaughter)	
which	 had	 typically	 resulted	 in	 lower	 sentences,	with	 a	 new	 category	which	was	 designed	 to	





























victim	 and	 offender	 followed	 by	 grappling	 whereby	 the	 victim	 got	 the	 upper	 hand	 and	













The	matters	which	make	 the	 present	 offence	 a	 serious	 one	 are	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
resulted	from	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	committed	in	a	public	place	by	a	person	who	




recently	 been	 placed	 on	 conditional	 liberty	 with	 a	 requirement	 not	 to	 drink	
alcohol.	
	
Finally,	 in	R	v	Lambaditis	 [2015]	NSWSC	746,	 the	Court	 found	 that	 the	 need	 for	 an	 emphatic	
sentencing	 response	 highlighting	 general	 deterrence	 (at	 [98])	 echoed	 loudly	 as	 the	 offence	

































Lambaditis	 the	Court	 stated	 that	 the	offender’s	 ‘…	 intoxicated	 state	provides	at	 least	 a	partial	
explanation	 for	 his	 behaviour	 but	 in	 no	way	 provides	 either	 justification	 or	mitigation	 of	 the	
objective	seriousness	of	the	offence	or	the	culpability	of	the	offender’	(at	[30]).	
	

















































victim	had	 then	moved	 his	 fists	 around	 in	 a	 boxing	motion	 followed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 pushes,	
continued	aggression	and	fists	still	clenched	prior	to	being	hit	(at	[5]).	In	relation	to	this	element	























There	 is	 a	 strong	 association	 between	 the	 characterisation	 of	 violence	 as	 gratuitous	 and	 an	






First,	 there	 is	 a	 notable	 similarity	 between	 the	 language	 employed	 by	 the	 NSWCCA—and	
endorsed	by	subsequent	 judgments—to	describe	the	hallmarks	of	the	types	of	violence	where	
general	 deterrence	 warrants	 greater	 emphasis	 (thus	 producing	 higher	 penalties),	 and	 the	
rhetorical	 tropes	about	alcohol‐related	street	violence	that	were	prominent	 in	both	the	media	
commentary	 and	 political	 discourse	 following	 Thomas	 Kelly’s	 death	 and	 Kieran	 Loveridge’s	
original	sentencing	(Quilter	2014a).	This	reinforces	the	point	made	earlier	that	the	NSWCCA’s	












followed	 that	 the	 sentencing	 judge’s	 statement	 that	 the	 sentencing	 decision	 to	 be	made	was	
‘constrained	to	provide	a	sentence	as	guided	by	the	overall	pattern	of	current	sentencing’	was	an	
error	(at	[52]	and	[54]).	The	NSWCCA	went	on	to	hold	that	sentencing	statistics	are	of	even	less	
assistance	 in	 the	offence	of	manslaughter	compared	with	other	offences,	as	 the	circumstances	














[Comparable	 sentencing	 judgments]	 of	 course,	 do	not	 disclose	 a	 range	of	 tariff.	





It	 is	 no	 longer	appropriate	 to	 [sic]	 for	 this	 court	 to	 regard	one	punch	or	 single	
punch	 cases	 of	manslaughter	 as	 constituting	 a	 single	 class	 of	 offence	 since	 the	





very	 wide	 range	 of	 criminality	 and	 culpability	 …	 The	 court	 must	 eschew	 any	






article,	 this	 has	 certainly	 been	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 decision:	my	 analysis	 of	 sentencing	 decisions	
handed	down	after	Loveridge	suggests	that,	if	it	is	determined	that	a	case	falls	within	the	Loveridge	
category	 the	 level	of	objective	seriousness	attached	 to	 that	case	operates	as	a	default	 starting	
point	 in	 the	 sentencing	process,	 resulting	 in	higher	sentences.	Any	deviation	 from	that	 line	of	
sentencing	severity	must	be	expressly	justified.	Ironically,	however,	the	NSWCCA’s	adoption	of	a	
careful	doctrinal	methodology	to	 identify	the	cases	 in	which	harsher	punishment	 is	said	to	be	
warranted	has,	ironically,	provided	sentencing	judges	with	the	tools	to	avoid	locating	instances	






death.	 This	 attack	 was	 random	 and	 unprovoked.	 The	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 NSWCCA	 in	 this	
sentencing	appeal	was	to	reaffirm	that	violence	+	public	+	intoxication	cases	carry	a	high	level	of	
objective	 seriousness	and	an	 additional	need	 for	 general	 deterrence	 (at	 [65]‐[66]).	 The	Court	
observed	 that,	 ‘[a]lthough	 it	 appears	 that	 his	 Honour	 acknowledged	 the	 principle	 of	 general	
deterrence	in	a	general	way	by	referring	to	s	3A	[of	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	








The	 features	of	 the	present	 case	which	 lead	me	 to	 conclude	 it	 is	 an	objectively	






















Mr	Morris	was	willing	 to	 grapple	with	 the	offender	 and	 initially	 seems	 to	 have	




mind	 the	 considerations	 of	 denunciation,	 punishment	 and	 general	 deterrence,	
which	call	for	the	emphatic	sentencing	response	discussed	in	Loveridge.	As	I	have	











violence—one	 factor	 …	 which	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 recent	 emphasis	 on	 general	
deterrence.	 Also,	 he	 was	 subject	 to	 some	 provocation	 by	 the	 deceased	 in	






























buoyant	mood	 and,	 at	 a	 relatively	 early	 hour	 of	 the	 evening,	 he	was	 intent	 on	
leaving	Kings	Cross	and	going	home.	It	was	the	unexpected	interactions	with	the	
three	young	persons	at	the	intersection	of	Darlinghurst	Road	and	Victoria	Street	


























However	 the	 difficulty	 in	 this	 particular	 case,	 as	 the	 Crown	 submissions	 also	
recognised,	is	the	part	played	by	the	offender’s	undoubted	psychiatric	illness.	This	
consideration	 distinguishes	 this	 case	 considerably	 from	 cases	 involving	








received	 and	deployed	 the	NSWCCA’s	 recalibration	of	 sentencing	practice	 in	 cases	of	 alcohol‐
related	 public	 violence.	 Consistent	 with	 principles	 of	 individualised	 justice,	 mindful	 of	 the	
potential	harshness	of	 too	 readily	 locating	a	 case	within	 the	Loveridge	 category,	 and	with	 the	
benefit	of	counsel	submissions,	judges	have	shown	a	willingness	to	distinguish	the	offences	and	











formal	 guideline	 judgment,18	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 Court	 was	 determined	 to	 put	 down	 some	













































































































































































































































































































































































In	 the	 sole	 case	 where	 the	 offender	 and	 victim	 were	 not	 strangers	 (R	 v	 Matthews),	 their	




In	 all	 nine	 cases	 the	 offender	 was	 originally	 charged	 with	 murder.	 In	 four	 of	 the	 cases,	 the	
Prosecution	accepted	a	plea	of	guilty	of	manslaughter.	 In	 four	other	cases,	 the	murder	charge	
went	to	trial,	and	the	accused	was	found	not	guilty	of	murder	but	guilty	of	manslaughter.	In	the	
final	case	(R	v	Matthews),	the	offender	was	initially	charged	with,	and	convicted	of,	murder.	On	




































Pre‐guilty	plea	reduction	 6y	10m	 11y	0.5m	 4y	2.5m	 7y	6m	 11y	4m	 3y	10m	
Head	sentence	 5y	2m	 8y	11m	 3y	9m	 5y	11m	 9y	0m	 3y	1m	















the	 legal	 landscape	has	changed	dramatically.	The	criminal	 law	now	supports	a	more	punitive	







landmark	 Loveridge	 decision	 in	 2014.	 The	 Loveridge	 effect	 described	 in	 this	 article	 is	 that	
individuals	who	cause	the	death	of	another	person—through	violence	perpetrated	in	public	while	






which	 have	 wider	 and	 long‐term	 consequences,	 including	 the	 potential	 for	 injustice	 (Quilter	
2014a).	Such	was	the	case	with	the	decision	in	2014	of	the	NSW	Parliament	to	create	new	offences	
of	assault	causing	death,	and	assault	causing	death	while	intoxicated.	On	the	other	hand,	Courts	
in	 Australia	 are	 rarely	 subjected	 to	 scrutiny	 and	 criticism	 for	 contributing	 to	 increased	
punitiveness	 in	 criminal	punishment.	On	 the	contrary,	 they	are	more	 likely	 to	be	criticised	 for	
perceived	 leniency.	 This	 article	 has	 shown,	 however,	 that,	 to	 date,	 it	 is	 the	 judicial	 arm	 of	














Secondly,	 unlike	 other	 manifestations	 of	 so‐called	 judicial	 ‘activism’,	 which	 are	 routinely	
criticised	 by	 politicians	 as	 ‘undemocratic’	 and	 illegitimate,	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 move	 to	 mandate	
tougher	sentences	 in	the	case	of	alcohol‐	and	drug‐related	public	violence	is	more	likely	to	be	
applauded	because	the	courts	are	seen	to	be	responding	to	the	same	community	anxieties	and	
attitudinal	 changes	 in	 society,	 and	 producing	 the	 same	 penal	 effects,	 as	 those	 which	 have	
dominated	government	rhetoric,	policy	and	legislative	reform	in	recent	years.		
	
Thirdly,	 in	 so	 doing,	 the	 courts	 appear	 to	 have	 endorsed	 the	 view,	 prominent	 in	 government	
policy	discourse,	that	alcohol‐	and	drug‐related	violence	inflicted	on	strangers	in	public	is	more	
objectively	serious	 than	violence	 that	occurs	 in	private	settings,	which	 frequently	 is	gendered	
domestic	violence	with	female	intimate	partners	as	victims	(McNamara	and	Quilter	2015;	Quilter	
et	al.	2016).	Neither	legislators	nor	judges	draw	the	distinction	in	such	stark	terms,	but	it	appears	


















1	 I	 acknowledge	 the	 excellent	 research	 assistance	 of	 Locky	 Auld	 and	 the	 financial	 support	 provided	 by	 the	 Legal	
Intersections	Research	Centre,	University	of	Wollongong.	
2	Previous	examples	of	 this	 tension	 include:	 guideline	 judgments;	 standard	non‐parole	 sentencing;	 and	mandatory	
sentencing	(see	generally	Brown	et	al.	2015:	1246‐1294).	









significant	 role	 in	 changing	 the	 criminal	 law’s	 treatment	 of	 alcohol‐fuelled	 criminal	 behaviour,	 should	 such	 a	
definition	be	adopted	in	future	cases,	this	has	the	potential	to	greatly	widen	the	net	of	those	caught	by	s	25A(2).	It	is	
















8	 See,	 for	 example,	R	 v	Bashford	 [2007]	NSWSC	 1380	 at	 [50].	 See	 also	R	 v	Maclurcan	 [2003]	NSWSC	 799	 at	 [25];	

































of	 voices	 compelling	 the	 violence.	Although	 the	 judge	 noted	 that	 the	 need	 for	 general	 deterrence	 and	 ‘emphatic	
justice’	was	ameliorated	accordingly,	this	case	has	been	included	because	it	nonetheless	demonstrates	the	heightened	
severity	of	sentencing	by	the	judiciary	post‐Loveridge.	The	case	of	Matia	v	R;	R	v	Matia	[2015]	NSWCCA	79	has	been	
excluded	because	the	violent	conduct	occurred	in	the	context	of	excessive	self‐defence	which	consequently	renders	
the	factual	circumstances	and	the	subsequent	sentence	incomparable	with	the	other	cases.	
20	Of	these	six	I	note	R	v	Wood	[2014]	NSWCCA	184	involved	a	single	double‐handed	push	by	the	offender	to	the	elderly	
victim;	R	v	Dyer	[2014]	NSWSC	1809	involved	a	push‐and‐shove	prior	to	a	single	fatal	punch	being	thrown	by	the	
offender.	
21	It	is	noted	that	Lane’s	appeal	against	conviction	was	dismissed:	Lane	v	R	[2017]	NSWCCA	46.	
22	In	R	v	Field	[2014]	NSWSC	1719,	although	the	Court	recognised	that	the	offender	had	been	consuming	alcohol	for	a	
significant	period	of	time	prior	to	the	offence,	as	no	evidence	was	led,	intoxication	could	not	be	taken	into	account	in	
the	determination	of	sentence.		
23‘Pre‐Loveridge	period’	here	refers	to	the	cases	surveyed	in	Quilter	2014b,	being	NSW	sentencing	decisions	from	1998‐
2013	involving	one	punch	manslaughters.	While	it	is	not	claimed	that	the	post‐Loveridge	cases	are	identical	to	those	
reviewed	in	the	earlier	study,	there	are	sufficient	similarities	between	the	two	groups	of	cases—including	that	they	
are	primarily	one	punch	alcohol‐related	cases	originally	charged	as	murder,	but	in	which	a	plea	to	manslaughter	was	
accepted	(except	in	one	instance	in	both	groups)—that	comparison	is	valid	and	illuminating.	
24	Although	it	is	noted	that	the	special	rule	against	intoxication	being	a	mitigating	factor	was	introduced	in	2014	into	
the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	21A(5AA),	see	above.	
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